Signal is widely regarded as the most secure messaging app because it is open-source, end-to-end encrypted, extensively tested by experts, and recommended by top privacy activists. Threema is a close second and has the same characteristics.

During the second week of January, Signal downloads reached 8.8 million with an increase of 3000% over the previous week, adding to its tens of millions of users.

Earlier that week, millions of citizens flocked to it in search of a safe haven for privacy, and replacements for close-circle social networking, following WhatsApp’s announcement of new data sharing with its parent Facebook led to endorsements by personalities. 

Later the same week, Trump and large numbers of far-right pro-Trump extremists, groups, and disinformation and propaganda operatives were kicked out by mainstream social media platforms - and extremist apps were shut down by mobile stores - following the storming of the US Capitol Hill. This lead to large numbers of those same persons and groups to download Signal, and other similar apps like Telegram, to exploit its obscurity to engage in insurrection plans and disinformation activities.

This indicates both the great potential of Signal to improve our digital sphere, as well as the huge challenges it faces to prevent its abuses.

Let’s look into it. 

Due to the strength of its encryption, Signal communications can only be hacked by installing malware on the user’s device. Yet, secure messaging cannot be more secure than the device they run on.

Meanwhile, even the most secure devices, like an iPhone, are remotely hackable by most nations, state-sponsored hackers, as well as by any private person willing to take a limited risk and invest between few tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars, by hiring suitable private or state hackers. Once hacked victims can also be continuously spied at very-low marginal costs, through platforms like NSA Turbine, NSA FoxAcid, and their private markets equivalents. The cost is lower if the hacker came into physical possession.

The cost is even lower if the device enters in temporary physical possession of thousands of entities that purchase such hacking capabilities - including many US public school districts - or persons close to them.

So, therefore, Signal offers some useful added privacy to ordinary citizens with very low inconvenience, but its level of privacy is wildly insufficient for the 1% among us that are most targeted illegitimately for political or economic reasons: the ones who really need it for themselves, and that we need in order to sustain a democratic society.

As opposed to all other messaging or social networking apps - that are not have end-to-end encryption or not strong enough - Signal cannot be subject to large-scale lawful interception by nations via illegitimate lawful access requests on the server-side - nor by nations and other entities via other server-side hacks. So, therefore, it hinders large-scale server-side privacy abuses, which is great. But it also hinders legitimate lawful access, which is very bad. 

Signal allows for group discussions, but since governments and criminals can hack a single member, they can therefore hack the message of small groups simply by hacking one of the members. Yet, since Signal groups can have up to 1000 members, this makes it very hard or impossible for law enforcement agencies to detect or stop crimes consisting of large-scale illegal propaganda, disinformation, or hate campaigns, such as those engaged by pro-Trump rioters in Parler. 

They cannot stop large groups engaging in wide-scale criminal activities, such as those that incite insurrectionist extremist mobs, or other radicalization activities, at home and abroad. Brazil and Myanmar are stark examples of the abuse of secure messaging apps like WhatsApp to spread disinformation that resulted in shifts to elector authoritarian regimes.

Signal mitigates such a problem by requiring a phone number for the account, though it is replaceable and not tied to the user’s mobile phone card, which gives governments more access to its user’s metadata: who interacts with who, when, or where. Signal could possibly further mitigate in the near future by imposing limits on the sharing of information and size of groups, as done for some time by WhatsApp. It may well have to start actively policing its users and taking down groups, as Telegram has started doing last week.

So, Signal is not able to prevent its abuse for grave crimes, that involve large numbers of users as victims or perpetrators.

In conclusion, though it is a great application delivering some privacy to ordinary citizens, we have to ask ourselves: is Signal really the model that can replace our messaging and social media to sustain our rights of privacy, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, social networking? Can it also concurrently and reliably prevent grave crimes that can affect us, others, or society at large?

Signal and similar apps cannot deliver privacy and security of personal and group communications that are needed and demanded by the 1% of persons that are most targeted by governments’ and criminals’ illegitimate or illegal hacking. These include journalists, politicians, activists, elected officials, and of the wealthy, the preferred target of cybercriminals. A UBS survey found that the 16 million high net worth individuals identify cybersecurity as their second greatest concern after “their country politics”. These persons really need the utmost privacy to regain peace of mind, freedom, and protect against extortions, blackmail, financial frauds, physical safety threats, and just intrusions in their intimate life. Paradoxically, the more money those wealthy persons have, the less cybersecurity they can buy, at whatever cost.

Nor can Signal and similar apps can deliver wide social spaces that prevent and restrict fake news, disinformation, propaganda, hate, frauds, and other crimes that may affect or target you or your close associates, even when law enforcement acquires external evidence of those crimes. It doesn’t offer a place where you can network with friends, family, and colleagues in a democratic and fair way, without being manipulated by powerful disinformation, political and hate campaigns, via bots, trolls, and fake news. 

Nor Signal, as is, can ever grow into becoming a better substitute of current mainstream social media networks, with larger groups and social media feeds, for the reasons explained above. If it will, every time we’ll venture out of our small close groups, we’ll find ourselves in a Wild West, worse than Twitter and Facebook, without the shred of a state sheriff or a private moderator in sight, that can prevent the worst. We’ll have no way to distinguish legit groups and citizens from fake ones. No way to distinguish fellow citizens from advertisers, criminals, political operatives, and bots trying to manipulate you, to sell you, or even hurt you. 

At TRUSTLESS.AI, we are building the Seevik Net to fill exactly those gaps, for the 1% most in need. 

It is centered on a Seevik Cloud and a Seevik Pod, a stylish user-friendly 2mm-thin personal computer that users will buy in 3-10 units for themselves and their close personal and business associates. It is carried in the back of custom leather wallets in many different styles. It is meant to complement and not replace your secure messaging apps and social media, which you’ll still need for your less sensitive communications with those that don’t have a Seevik Pod. 

Initially, it is reserved for the 1% that are most economically and politically targeted, including executive staff and clients large private banks, and large companies.

Seevik Net will be the digital equivalent of your living room, where you can safely and freely engage with your family, friends, and guests in an enjoyable, human, respectful, and democratic way. We’d all love to achieve the same benefits, or even remotely close, via an app, but it is impossible, just like in the physical world we expect our living room to be separated by a wall from public urban spaces.

Seevik Net is not only used to safely connect with your close associates but your new private and democratic public sphere, your social media of choice, where you can be-friend similar-minded persons and groups; post, share, learn and discuss your passions; discuss news in a way that is enjoyable and conducive to a civil and deliberative discussion; were referenced and evidence-based posts, with a certified origin, are given preference. You’ll be able to communicate, network, transact, and much more with dozens of third-party apps.

We achieve such levels of privacy, security, and democratic control of the resulting media space, via an uncompromising zero-trust approach down to CPU design and fabrication oversight - and a transparent solution to the need for legitimate in-person lawful access - as validated by a highly democratic and resilient Trustless Computing Certification Body, promoted by our non-profit arm.

In the long run, the Pod will become the default backscreen of tens of millions of Android phones (video), complementing our digital public sphere with a vibrant and secure private sphere. Users of partnering secure messaging apps, like Signal or Threema, will be able to share the same secure and democratic social space offered by the Seevik Cloud, albeit without the unique levels of privacy and security offered only by the Pod.